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THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington

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PRES.

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DIA & NSC REVIEWS COMPLETED

October 19, 1962

NSA review(s) completed.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Review of U. S. Foreign Intelligence and Related Activities
in Southeast Asia and the Far East

On October 19, 1962, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board submitted a number of subsidiary recommendations growing out of the subject review, which were not incorporated in the Board's October 5, 1962, report to the President. Those subsidiary recommendations which appear to be of primary interest to you are enclosed.

Before final action is taken on the enclosed recommendations it is requested that there be provided:

a. A report by the Department of Defense reflecting views and comments on Recommendations 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10; and

b. A joint report by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, reflecting views and comments on Recommendations 3 and 4.

It would be appreciated if the reports requested above could be provided to this office and to the President's Board by November 23, 1962.

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McGeorge Bundy

cc: The President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board

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**THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington**

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

October 19, 1962

**Subject: Excerpts from Subsidiary Board Recommendations Based on
Review of U. S. Foreign Intelligence and Related Activities
in Southeast Asia and the Far East**

1. That the National Security Agency (NSA) review the function of the Office of the NSA Pacific Representative with a view to clarifying (a) its mission, (b) the manner in which it fits into the CINCPAC structure, and (c) the nature of command relationships between that office and the various NSA personnel deployed elsewhere in the Pacific.
2. That the DOD further explore the feasibility of (a) staggering the rotation schedules of the U. S. Army Intelligence Advisers to the Vietnamese Army (ARVN) in order that maximum use may be made of the excellent services which they are providing to ARVN at Command, Corps, Division and Sector levels (most of these U. S. Army Intelligence Advisers are scheduled for rotation during the first quarter of CY '63), and (b) providing more extensive Vietnamese and perhaps French language training to Army personnel designated for assignment as such Advisers.
3. That the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director, DIA, continue to place emphasis on the respective efforts of U. S. civilian and military intelligence units in South Vietnam to achieve further improvements in the capabilities of the intelligence and security services of the GVN.
4. That the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director, DIA, take the necessary steps in their respective areas to assure adequate, timely lateral exchange of intelligence reports on the part of the various U. S. intelligence units in South Vietnam, particularly the J-2 elements of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, the U. S. Service Attaches and the CIA Station in Saigon. NSC
5. That the DIA, in consultation with the three military intelligence services (a) consider extending from two to three years the tours of duty of Service Attaches in Bangkok (we do not consider Bangkok to be a "hardship post"), and (b) examine the possibility of providing more extensive training in the Thai language for Service Attaches who are selected for future assignments in Bangkok.

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6. That the DIA assure completion of arrangements (which it initiated at the time of the Board review) whereby photo interpretation personnel of the USAF on Taiwan and at the 67th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron in Yokota, Japan will be provided with all reports produced by the Chinese Nationalist Air Force (CNAF) Photo Interpretation Center at Tao Yuan Air Base on Taiwan. (These reports, which were not being received by any element of the U. S. Government at the time of the Board review, contain the results of independent CNAF interpretations of photographic intelligence obtained from reconnaissance flights over the China mainland.)

7. That the DIA, in consultation with the Assistant Chief of Staff/Intelligence, Department of the Army (a) survey and assess the organization, management and effectiveness of the clandestine collection operations conducted in the Pacific Area by the Army's 500th Intelligence Corps Group (ICG), and (b) take action to assure early coordination with appropriate CIA Stations of the few ICG clandestine operations which have not yet been so coordinated. (Our preliminary review of the ICG's clandestine collection efforts reflects that they appear to be in pursuance of objectives which are in the national interest and which are not being met by other intelligence elements of our Government and which in most instances are cordially welcomed by such elements.)

8. That the DIA, in consultation with other interested U. S. military intelligence elements, conduct appropriate review to assure that, in line with JCS guidance previously provided to the Unified Commands, maximum use is being made of the very substantial intelligence potential of MAAGs and JUSMACs wherever deployed.

9. That the DIA, in consultation with the military intelligence services, conduct appropriate review to assure that maximum utilization is made of Service Attache personnel, particularly in countries where intelligence normally acquired by Service Attaches is available through MAAC, JUSMAG, or other U. S. military organizations.

10. That the DIA, in consultation with the NSA and the military intelligence services, undertake to effect a reduction in the length of time now consumed in obtaining sensitive security clearances required by personnel assigned to critical U. S. military installations overseas. (We noted this problem at the Warning Indications Center, [redacted] and we have been informed that a similar problem exists at other overseas locations.)

[redacted]

[redacted]

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